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2 
Key points 
 
• A ‘couple penalty’ suggests that families on low incomes with children are 
economically better off living apart than living together as a result of the tax 
and benefit system. The reverse situation could be called a ‘separation 
penalty’, whereby members of a couple lose out financially if they begin to 
live apart.  
 
• To calculate such penalties, we need not just to look at the effect of taxes, 
benefits and tax credits on incomes, but also at how much more it costs to 
live apart than to live together. ‘Equivalence scales’ take such a view, but the 
ones used by the Government to compare household incomes are not based 
on evidence of actual costs. Research for the Minimum Income Standard 
(MIS) provides a more solid basis, and suggests that equivalence scales 
have underestimated how much cheaper it is for two people to live as a 
couple than separately.  
 
• The simplest question that can be asked in testing the couple penalty is: 
does the benefits system provide a different proportion of a family’s daily 
living needs if they live together and if they live apart?  The clear answer 
from the calculations in this paper is no. The benefits system provides very 
similar living standards to families living together and apart. This is true 
whether measuring income as a percentage of needs as specified by the MIS 
or as a percentage of average income using official figures.  
 
• In general, non-working families with children have about two-thirds of what 
they need for a minimum acceptable standard of living. The shortfall of one-
third of required living costs is greater in cash terms for couples that split up, 
because their overall living costs are greater. Thus, in cash terms, there is a 
separation penalty for families on benefits, whichever form of measurement 
is used.  
 
• For working couples, the situation is more complex. However, using the MIS 
basis there appears only to be a couple penalty where someone who lives 
alone without children is able to get a low-cost rent, for example through 
social housing, which seems unlikely to be a realistic expectation. On the 
other hand, a significant separation penalty can exist for people on very low 
wages, especially where there is only one earner.  
 
3 
• Using the official equivalence scale, there is no systematic evidence of a 
couple penalty for working families with a single earner, but with two earners 
there is, in general, such a penalty. Thus, a couple penalty only exists for a 
particular group under particular assumptions: for dual earner families on low 
incomes, where we assume that the relative needs of singles and couples 
are as arbitrarily described in an equivalence scale rather than as shown in 
researched evidence.  
 
• Under Universal Credit, new conditions will apply, but its foundation stone will 
be basic out-of-work entitlements. It would be misguided to alter the relative 
value of these entitlements to become more favourable to couples compared 
with singles than the present system based on the false assertion that out-of-
work benefits presently contain an incentive to split up.    
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“Yes, I do think it’s wrong that our benefits system gives couples with children 
more money if they live apart – and we will bring an end to the couple penalty.” 
(David Cameron, Conservative Party Conference, 2008) 
 
“It is vital that we find a way of addressing welfare need without creating perverse 
incentives for the parents of children on low to modest incomes to live apart.” 
(Frank Field MP, in Draper, 2009)  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Is there a ‘couple penalty’ in our benefits and tax credits system? In answering 
this question, we need to start by thinking very carefully about what we mean by 
it. 
 
A couple penalty would exist if, in some way, two people are significantly better 
off (economically) living apart than living together as a result of the way the 
government transfers income to and from different types of household. If the 
reverse is true, we could say that there is a ‘separation penalty’. 
 
This immediately raises several crucial issues. The following are five questions 
about definition and coverage, and in each case a summary of how this paper 
proposes to address them to shed light on the existence or otherwise of a couple 
penalty.  
 
• What do we mean by ‘better off’, in economic terms?  Two households are 
more expensive to run than one. To judge whether people can have a higher 
living standard if they separate, we need to be able to work out whether any 
extra income that they gain from doing so is more than enough to cover this 
extra cost. This requires a sound basis for measuring the relative spending 
needs of singles and couples.  
 
This paper shows how using a basis for relative requirements based on 
research into the needs of different households produces different answers 
than other, more arbitrary weightings used in official income comparisons. 
Specifically, it gives results based on two kinds of weighting: those identified 
through research on a Minimum Income Standard (MIS) and the more 
arbitrary official weightings used in government comparisons of household 
incomes.  
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• Does it make sense to make a joint ‘better off’ calculation for individuals living 
in two households rather than one?  Across separated families, the allocation 
of joint income to meet the needs of different individuals is likely to differ from 
a family living together. This raises important issues around the well-being of 
mothers compared with fathers and of children compared with each parent.  
 
While these issues are important, they are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Here, we are concerned principally with analysing whether it is true, as has 
been implied by those who state that there is a ‘couple penalty’, that there is a 
significant incentive to split up when looking at the joint income of all those 
involved. There is scope for empirical research following up such calculations 
by observing actual patterns of spending among couples who live together 
and who live apart, and their consequences for the well-being of mothers, 
fathers and children. 
 
• Which aspects of income and needs are we considering?  We would get 
different answers according to whether or not we include housing costs in 
these calculations, and if so what we assume those costs to be.  
 
The analysis below focuses on the consequences of the present benefits and 
tax credits system on families’ disposable incomes, after housing costs, 
recognising that differences in total income can give a highly inaccurate idea 
of effects on families’ well-being where housing costs vary widely in different 
cases. However, in making these calculations we need to make assumptions 
about housing costs in some cases, and so we also consider what happens 
when these assumptions are varied.  
 
Our focus on disposable income after housing costs reflects the fact that the 
purpose of this paper is to investigate whether families are better or worse off 
together or apart. Housing costs are more relevant to debates about the cost 
to the taxpayer of supporting two families rather than one – potentially paying 
two rents through Housing Benefit – but that is not the issue being considered 
here. We are testing the assertion that the system encourages families to live 
in a more expensive way to the taxpayer, by providing an extra incentive to do 
so. Where the additional cost paid for by the state all goes into additional 
rents caused by people living apart, this does not create an incentive in terms 
of them becoming materially better off. 
 
• Who are we interested in, in terms of whether people are in or out of work, 
and their earnings levels?  Our tax and benefits system does not give the 
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same relative treatment to people on all incomes. Thus we may get different 
answers according to whether we are considering the case of someone on 
the average income or above, on a just-adequate standard of living or on 
social security benefits below the poverty line.  
 
This paper focuses on people on low incomes, whose living standards are 
most greatly affected by the size of transfers from the state. However, it does 
not look only at those on the very lowest incomes, who depend entirely on 
out-of-work benefits, but also at those in work but with low earnings, many of 
whom rely heavily on tax credits. Moreover, it considers mainly families with 
children, partly because these families have the greatest dependence on tax 
credits, but also because concern over a ‘couple penalty’ has been voiced 
principally in relation to the risk of the harm that it could do to children if it 
encouraged families to break up.  
 
• What assumptions should we make about the working patterns of two people 
according to whether they are living at home or living apart, and what are we 
assuming about childcare for those with children?  When considering working 
families, we need to be careful to make reasonable assumptions about how 
these patterns do or do not change in new household circumstances.  
 
Here, we analyse the couple penalty/separation penalty by making the most 
straightforward assumption possible: that both members of the couple work 
the same amount of time whether living together or apart. We consider three 
such examples – with neither working, with just the father working and with 
the father working full time and the mother working part time. For each of 
these three cases, we compare the situation where the couple lives together 
with the situation where the mother lives with the children and the father lives 
on his own. For the final case, where a father is working full time and a 
mother part time, we assume that childcare is needed for half the working 
week, whether the couple is living together or apart.  
 
At the heart of this analysis is the use of research from the Minimum Income 
Standard (MIS) project, giving real evidence on the relative needs of singles 
and couples (Bradshaw et al., 2008; Hirsch, 2011). Since 2008, MIS has 
provided a set of household income requirements based directly on research 
into needs. It is based on judgements made by members of the public about 
what things different types of household would need to be able to buy in order 
to reach a minimum acceptable standard of living. This research allows a 
closer, more directly evidenced examination of how different entitlements for 
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couples and separated families relate to differences in their needs than 
previous research on the couple penalty (see Box 1).  
 
Box 1  Previous measures of the couple penalty 
 
Previous reports on the couple penalty have taken a less complete approach 
than the one used in this paper, especially to the comparison of differences in 
joint income with differences in joint living costs. Adam and Brewer (2010) only 
measure the income difference, without commenting on the extent to which this 
is offset by differences in costs, on the basis that a ‘better off’ calculation is in the 
eye of the beholder. Draper (2009) takes account of economies of scale in 
housing costs but not of other ways in which costs might change as a result of 
living arrangements. He simply asserts (without supporting evidence) that ‘any 
saving in utility and food costs is unlikely to cancel out’ the couple penalty that he 
identifies, and does not comment on other potential economies of scale such as 
the cost of furnishing and equipping an additional living room, kitchen and 
bedroom for adults living separately.  
 
The Centre for Social Justice’s Dynamic Benefits report (Centre for Social 
Justice, 2009), which has been the reference point for much subsequent 
comment on the couple penalty and on welfare reform, does make adjustments 
for the greater spending requirements of couples living apart. It uses the OECD 
equivalence scale to make the adjustment. As shown below, this scale does not 
provide an evidence basis for comparing the actual needs of different household 
types in the UK today. The Dynamic Benefits report argues, however, that this is 
the scale used by the Government to compare different families’ incomes, and 
there is clearly an argument for policies that are consistent with this measure, 
however approximate it might be. However the actual calculations made in the 
report appear to include housing costs, without specifying what assumptions 
have been made about their level. The calculations are likely to be highly 
sensitive to such assumptions. In making comparisons with basic benefit levels, 
which are not supposed to cover housing costs, it is unclear why these costs are 
being included.  
 
Dynamic Benefits also considers, based on modelling the situation of working 
couples with children in the Family Resources Survey, how many face a couple 
penalty. It finds that across a small band of earnings equivalent to working just 
over 16 hours per week on the minimum wage, a majority of families are 
materially better off living apart than living together. On other working patterns, 
the reverse is true for the majority of families. Oddly, the report uses this to argue 
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that there is a strong couple penalty, even though it suggests that overall the 
great majority of couples on low incomes would be worse off if they split up, and 
the report does not quantify the size of couple penalty being faced by some 
families (it could be that, for many, it is too small to have any real significance). It 
certainly seems unwarranted to use this evidence to argue that there is a 
systematic bias against couples staying together.  
 
 
The following analysis starts in section 2 by looking at the existence or otherwise 
of a couple penalty under a number of scenarios, using alternative weightings for 
the needs of different family types. These are the main results calculated in 
answer to the central question being asked in this paper. The paper then goes 
into more detail, in section 3, in analysing some of the factors that influence 
these results, looking in turn at the significance of equivalence scales and of 
various features of the tax and benefit system. Section 4 reviews briefly some of 
the wider issues that may be asked about the couple penalty and its effect on 
incentives and behaviour. Section 5 draws conclusions.  
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Main calculations 
 
Basis 
 
The following calculations consider whether a father, mother and their children 
would be better or worse off living together than living apart, assuming certain 
patterns of living and earning. The measure of ‘better or worse off’ is based on 
how, in these two situations, total income compares to benchmarks of ‘adequate’ 
income that would give all the individuals involved a minimum acceptable living 
standard. Specifically, they look at how actual income compares to such a 
benchmark in terms both of the percentage of an adequate income that a family 
receives and the absolute deficit or surplus (in £s) in their income compared with 
the benchmark. For example, if a family living together got 80 per cent of what 
they needed, but living apart they got 85 per cent, there would be a ‘couple 
penalty’ representing 5 per cent of what they need. Or if they were £10 short of 
their total needs living together, but £20 short living apart, there would be a 
‘separation penalty’ of £10.  
 
Results using two main benchmarks are shown here. One is the MIS: a direct 
calculation of what is needed by different households. The second is a measure 
based on the official government ‘equivalence scale’ (the scale drawn up by the 
OECD) – a more arbitrary means of comparing the needs of different household 
types when comparing incomes (see section 3 below). In both cases, the 
definition of income ‘adequacy’ for a couple is set at a similar level, but the 
weightings used to calculate what would be adequate for that family living apart 
are different.  
 
These comparisons look at the situation for one, two or three children 
respectively. They look at scenarios where nobody is working, where a father is 
working full time and a mother not working and where a father is full time and 
mother half time. (These examples of working patterns are by no means 
comprehensive, but give examples of some common patterns: mothers both in 
couples and as lone parents are more likely to work part time, or not to work at 
all, than fathers.)  
 
We also assume: 
 
• That a separation involves a father moving out and a mother staying with her 
children. This is not the universal pattern, but 92 per cent of lone parents are 
mothers.  
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• That each working adult earns £9 an hour (in our main scenarios). This is 
above the minimum wage (which relatively few people earn) and equates to 
about the lower quartile of earnings (one in four people earn less than this, 
three in four earn more). It can thus be seen as a ‘typical’ wage for someone 
in the lower half of the distribution. For working families, we also show results 
for a scenario with the minimum wage in our calculations for working families, 
with two children.  
 
• The couple with children is living in council housing, but if the father moves 
out, he will have to find somewhere to live in the private sector. We have 
taken as an example a rent at the lower quartile of private rents for a one 
bedroom flat (cheaper than three quarters and more expensive than a 
quarter of flats of this type). These rents are designed to represent housing 
costs in the lowest category that one might expect to be available for low-
income families in these circumstances. They incorporate the assumptions 
that the result of a father leaving a family with children would be to subject 
him to a higher category of rent (since he would not be prioritised for social 
housing), but that as someone on a low income he would still seek a modest 
rent within this category. An alternative scenario shows what would happen if 
the father is indeed able to get a council flat, shown for working families with 
two children. (For out-of-work families, we look only at the adequacy of 
benefits to cover post-rent costs, so the rent level is not relevant for our 
calculations.)   
 
• The family with a full time and half time working parent needs to pay for half 
time childcare living together, and where they split up leaving the half time 
working parent responsible for children she requires half time childcare too.  
 
The full data for these comparisons are shown in Appendix 1. 
 
Results for families on benefits 
 
The simplest case to consider is whether the benefits system allows non-working 
families with children to be significantly better off living together or living apart. 
Basic benefits give families with children about two-thirds of what they need to 
reach a standard of living considered an acceptable minimum, according to the 
MIS based on what the public say are minimum needs. Figure 1 shows the 
extent to which this proportion is different for families living together and living 
apart, using two versions of the weighting of the needs of different households. 
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(This graph and the following ones compare the combined incomes of all 
members of these families with the needs of the household/s that they live in.)  
 
Figure 1  Family on benefits:  Couple penalty as percentage of 
family needs 
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Figure 1 shows that, regardless of whether MIS or the official equivalence scale 
is used, the UK’s benefits system does not give substantially more or less to 
families, as a percentage of their needs, whether they live together or apart. Here 
and in the following graphs, we use a threshold of 5 per cent of overall needs to 
indicate whether a family is significantly better off together or apart. The only 
case where there is an effect in these terms is for a couple with one child, who 
are slightly better off staying together on the MIS basis. In no case is there a 
couple penalty on either basis, even one below the 5 per cent threshold.  
 
Another way of looking at this is to consider in absolute rather than percentage 
terms how much families are falling short of what they need. On this basis, the 
comparison of families on benefits is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2  Family on benefits:  Couple penalty £ per week (relative 
to family needs) 
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In terms of an absolute shortfall, there is a marked separation penalty for families 
on benefits in all cases. (Here the threshold of a significant difference is set at 
£20 a week.) Using the MIS basis, the penalty for separation is very severe in 
these terms. To understand why, imagine that a family is getting exactly two-
thirds of an ‘adequate’ income living together, and that after splitting up the total 
of what a mother living with her children and a father living alone get is also two-
thirds of the total they would require for an adequate living standard. But this total 
of the two households is greater than it had been for the household when living 
together: you need more to live apart than to live together. Thus, the deficit of a 
third compared to needs adds up to more when separated, because it is a third of 
a larger amount.  
 
Is this greater absolute shortfall for separated families on benefits relevant?  Not 
if you assume that the family’s weekly spending is equal to their benefit income, 
and the hardship caused by this being one-third below what is needed is equally 
spread across family members. On the other hand, families trying to preserve 
acceptable living standards while out of work may find it harder to do so if 
separation increases the extra cost of doing so. For example, a temporarily 
workless family would have to run down savings or run up debts by more to meet 
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this extra cost. A related point is that parental sacrifice to help ensure that 
children get what they need is likely to be harder to mediate in a separated family 
– where both a co-resident parent and an absent parent are having to live at 
levels that prevent them from meeting their own needs, even before such a 
sacrifice.  
 
Results for a single earner family 
 
The next set of scenarios looks at a family in which one person is working full 
time. Figure 3 shows the extent of any couple penalty expressed as a percentage 
of family needs. The first three comparisons are based on the core assumptions 
of a wage of £9 an hour and social housing available where children are present, 
but not for a single person living without children. Regardless of the number of 
children, the results here show only insignificant differences, slightly in favour of 
living together using the MIS weightings and apart using the official OECD 
equivalence scale.  
 
Figure 3  Only father working (full time):  Couple penalty as 
percentage of family needs 
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The last two pairs of bars in Figure 3 show variations, based on a two-child 
family. One scenario that would improve the incentive to live apart is if the 
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additional rent involved in running two households were contained because the 
single person was able to rent a flat from a social housing provider at a low rent: 
we call this the ‘man gets council flat’ scenario. It seems improbable that a 
couple splitting up would count on such an outcome, but on the other hand it 
illustrates how a couple already living apart on low rents for some reason may 
have a financial disincentive to move in together when having children, if the rent 
saving from doing so were therefore limited. In this scenario, there would be a 
significant couple penalty on both measures. On the other hand, in another 
scenario, in which the wage is assumed to be very low but other factors are the 
same as in the main two child case, there would be a separation penalty.  
 
Overall, then, as with the non-working family, there is no systematic bias in 
favour of either living together or living apart for this single earner family in 
percentage terms. Figure 4 shows the same results in terms of the absolute 
deficit compared with an adequate income. This kind of family still has a shortfall 
of about 20 per cent compared with what they would need as a minimum, so 
having the larger requirements associated with living apart does make the 
shortfall worse in absolute terms. Figure 4 hence shows things tilted more in 
favour of staying together when considering the absolute shortfall than for the 
percentage calculation in Figure 3. On a MIS basis, there is no longer a 
significant couple penalty even if the single man is able to pay a social rent. On 
either basis, the separation penalty on the minimum wage is very substantial in 
absolute terms.  
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Figure 4  Only father working (full time):  Couple penalty £ per 
week (relative to family needs) 
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Results for dual earner family 
 
Finally, we look at an example of a family where a father is working full time and 
a mother part time. Even on modest wages, such a family can get close to what 
they need – for example, in the case of a couple living together with two children, 
earning £9 an hour, they would have £374 a week after childcare and rent, 
compared with the £397 that they would need according to the MIS. But to what 
extent is this ability to meet their needs affected by their living arrangements?   
 
Figure 5 shows that, measured by the MIS, such a family faces a significant 
couple penalty if they have three children or if the man can rent a flat from a 
social landlord, but a separation penalty with one child. On the other hand, using 
the official OECD equivalence scale, there is a clear-cut couple penalty in all of 
the cases shown, except where there is just one child. Figure 6 shows the same 
pattern of results when looking at the couple penalty in terms of absolute rather 
than percentage shortfalls. (This similarity is due to that fact that in these 
examples, family income is similar to need, so separation no longer has the 
effect of greatly increasing the absolute amount represented by a given 
percentage shortfall, due to the higher total needs of the separated family.)   
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Figure 5  Father working full time, mother half time:  Couple 
penalty as percentage of family needs 
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Figure 6  Father working full time, mother half time:  Couple 
penalty £ per week (relative to family needs) 
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This final set of results shows the one combination of assumptions where a 
couple penalty is the dominant pattern. This is where it is assumed that there are 
two workers in the family and where relative needs are measured on the ‘official’ 
basis rather than according to the direct results of research into the relative 
needs of different families.  
 
The above results have considered whether there is a couple or separation 
penalty in a range of specific scenarios. It is also possible to consider all 
combinations of the factors examined here (number of children, wages and 
housing status), to see whether there are more extreme cases. Doing so shows 
that the highest couple penalty, of 11 per cent or £53 a week (on the MIS basis), 
occurs for a family with three children, with both partners working for £9 an hour, 
where the father can get a council flat or similar low rent if he moves out. The 
highest separation penalty, of 13 per cent or £73, is for a family with one child 
with a single earner on the minimum wage, where moving out means going into 
private rented accommodation.  
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What lies behind these results?  
 
It will by now be evident that the extent to which families are better off living 
together or apart, or neither, varies considerably according to one’s assumptions 
and according to the specific circumstances of the family in question. This 
produces no clear overall ‘couple penalty’ or ‘separation penalty’. But what lies 
behind the effects described here?  The following analysis looks, respectively, at 
the issues of ‘equivalence’, or the relative needs of different family types, at how 
this relates to the basic benefits and at the shape of the in-work tax credit and 
benefits systems.  
 
Equivalence: The relative needs of different households  
 
It can be seen in the results that the official equivalence scales would tend to 
suggest somewhat higher couple penalties or lower separation penalties than the 
results of the MIS research. This is quite simply because MIS research finds that 
the additional cost of two adults living in separate households compared with 
living as a couple is greater than assumed by the equivalence scales (details 
below). Put another way, the equivalence scales underestimate economies of 
scale of living together, according to MIS research. Note also that the 
equivalence scale used in official comparisons before 2003, the McClements 
Scale, assumed even smaller economies of scale than the present (OECD) 
scale. Appendix 1 shows results for the McClements scale as well as for MIS and 
the OECD scale. In the first of these, the incentives to stay together are weaker 
than for the comparisons made so far, but the overall pattern is not very different 
from that described for the OECD scale.  
 
Unlike for MIS, neither of the equivalence scales is linked to evidence about what 
different family types in the UK today actually do need in order to achieve an 
equivalent living standard (see Box 2). When the UK Government replaced the 
McClements scale with the OECD scale, it did so in order to permit international 
comparability of poverty measurement rather than based on evidence that the 
new scale more accurately represented need.  
 
Box 2  Equivalence scales and relative income requirements 
 
Economic research in the 1970s and the 1980s sought to use an indirect method 
of considering the relationship between household composition, income and 
economic well-being (‘welfare’). This involved considering how spending patterns 
vary across different types of household according to income. Poorer households 
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spend proportionately more on certain categories of goods and services, and the 
extent to which a household’s spending is concentrated on such items 
(‘necessities’) can be seen as an indicator of the family’s welfare. If, for example, 
a larger family with twice the income of a smaller one spends the same on 
necessities, this method estimates that the larger family needs twice the income 
to achieve an equivalent welfare level.  
 
One such study (McClements, 1977) was the basis for the scale used for 
measuring poverty in the UK until 2003. A review of how economic models had 
sought to construct such scales (Banks and Johnson, 1993) showed that the 
answers they provide are influenced by the assumptions fed into them and 
concluded:  ‘The construction of an ideal equivalence scale is likely to defeat the 
ingenuity of economists’ (p72).  
 
The OECD scale used in present poverty measurement by the UK Government 
was devised as a rough compromise between scales previously used in 
individual countries. Its main purpose was to have a common basis for 
comparison. It starts from the simple principle that the need of the second person 
in a couple is half that of the first (i.e. a single person requires two-thirds as much 
as a couple) – an entirely plausible assumption, which is easy to understand 
rather than scientifically accurate. The OECD itself has so little confidence in this 
scale that it has recently abandoned it for a new, equally arbitrary version, based 
on the assumption that the needs of a family are proportional to the square root 
of the number of people it contains (e.g. four people need only twice as much as 
one person, since the square root of four is two, and the square root of one is 
one).This was adopted because it makes equivalisation easier to compute in 
income studies, and produces similar results to the previous scale.  
 
Thus, while equivalence scales have not been completely plucked out of the air, 
they cannot in any sense be described as estimates of the relative needs of 
different types of family in the UK in 2012. In their main purpose of estimating 
poverty levels, this may not matter much: the scale that is chosen does not 
necessarily change greatly the level of poverty reported and, as long as a 
consistent basis is used, it allows us to monitor trends over time. However, using 
such scales to assess the fairness of the tax and benefit system is more 
problematic. As shown in this paper, different scales produce different answers to 
questions such as ‘is there a couple penalty?’  Any policy decision based on the 
answer to such a question needs therefore to consider carefully whether the 
answer rests on a fair and robust assessment of the relative needs of different 
families.  
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On the other hand, the MIS now provides a less arbitrary basis for comparing the 
overall income needs of singles and couples. It can also be used to consider the 
extent to which relative benefit levels reflect relative needs.  
 
One simple comparison is between, on the one hand, the weightings for single 
adults compared with couples produced by these different criteria and, on the 
other, the weightings for singles and couples in out-of-work benefits. Since basic 
benefits such as Income Support are not designed to cover rent, this initial 
calculation needs to consider relative needs net of housing costs. (At least in 
situations where housing benefits covered all of their rent whether a couple lived 
together or apart, the relationship between Income Support and everyday living 
costs after rent would determine incentives.) 
 
In the McClements scale originally used in the UK, a single adult is considered to 
require 55 per cent as much as a couple, after housing costs. In the OECD scale, 
the equivalent is 58 per cent. In the MIS calculations, the figure is substantially 
higher (for details of calculations, see Appendix 2). A single person without 
children requires a budget 63 per cent as high as that of a couple without 
children, once taxes and rent have been paid. For families with children, when 
considering an equivalent figure comparing the needs of having one adult or two, 
the result is similar, although this adult-based difference actually varies 
somewhat according to the number of children in the family (which create 
different contexts for overall family spending). In the most common sized family, 
with two children, the figure is also 63 per cent. For some other families it works 
out higher (69 per cent with one child; 66 per cent with three children) but given 
that over two-thirds of single-unit non-pensioner households have either two 
children or no children, the 63 per cent figure represents a reasonable 
benchmark. 
 
This finding from MIS that a single person needs 63 per cent as much as a 
couple, rather than 55 per cent or 58 per cent as assumed by the equivalence 
scales, suggests that these scales understate the real needs of singles 
compared with couples. Looked at another way, the MIS results show that two 
adults living apart together need 2x63 per cent or 126 per cent of a couple, so 
the couple needs 100/126 or 79 per cent as much together as living apart . Thus, 
the couple needs 21 per cent less than the two singles (100-79), which 
represents the economy of scale gained from living together. The two 
equivalence scales referred to above imply much smaller economies of scale, 
amounting to just 9 per cent and 14 per cent respectively calculated on the same 
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basis.   
 
Equivalence and basic benefit rates 
 
We can now compare these weightings with the amounts paid to single adults 
and to couples in Income Support or Jobseekers Allowance. These amounts are 
presently £67.50 for a single person and £105.95 for a couple. In terms of ‘after 
housing cost’ income, this means that a single person has around 62 per cent as 
much as a couple.1   
 
Thus the disposable income of a single as a percentage of a couple on Income 
Support (62 per cent) is very similar to the percentage that MIS calculates is 
required (63 per cent). Using either of the equivalence scales, the benefits 
system would appear to overestimate the needs of singles compared with 
couples, at 55 per cent and 58 per cent respectively, after housing costs.  
 
This finding raises the interesting question of why, if benefits overestimate needs 
in favour of singles using equivalence scales, there is no significant couple 
penalty on benefits shown in the main calculations used in this paper (even on 
the McClements scale it is only 1.5 per cent with two children). The answer is 
somewhat complex. In summary, the less favourable effect in terms of benefits 
for adults when they live together, relative to these scales, is offset by a more 
favourable effect, relative to household needs, of benefits for their children. The 
equivalence scales assume that children need rather little compared with adults: 
in the OECD scale, two children living with a couple are assumed only to add 40 
per cent to the costs of the two adults. In fact, benefits for children provide more 
than this amount. So the presence of children helps reduce percentage shortfall 
compared with overall presumed need. However, the extent that it does so 
depends on the ratio of this ‘surplus’ children’s income to the needs of adults. In 
separated families, the latter is higher: two adults need more when they live 
apart. So the relative degree to which ‘more than adequate’ children’s benefits 
(using equivalence scales) offset inadequate adult benefits is smaller in 
separated families, making up for the fact that these families appear a bit better 
off in terms of adult benefits on these scales.  
 
The structure of in-work tax credits and benefits 
 
The variable results shown in the calculations about an in-work couple penalty in 
this paper reflect the fact that low income families face multiple conditions 
affecting their net incomes. These include eligibility or otherwise for Housing 
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Benefit and Council Tax Benefit and the structure of the ‘tapering’ (reduction with 
rising income) of tax credits. Families of different sizes and on different levels of 
earnings face different effects when living together or apart.  
 
Overall, the results suggest more evidence of a couple penalty, or less of a 
separation penalty, where families earn somewhat more rather than less. In 
particular, staying together is relatively less favourable where there are two 
earners in a low-wage family than one, and where wages are somewhat above 
the minimum wage rather than on the minimum wage.  
 
A general explanation for this is that for a family on very low earnings, there are 
very large in-work benefits and tax credits that do not increase proportionately to 
cover the new costs of the single person household of the partner who moves out 
(because in-work benefits for people without children are much less generous). 
Families with less low earnings have more modest entitlements as couples, and 
therefore less to lose in this respect. This applies especially to Housing Benefit, 
which runs out quickly as earnings rise above a very basic level.  
 
Thus, it is interesting to note that, contrary to the popular assumption that the 
more dependent on the state families are the more they are being encouraged to 
break up, there is a significant influence in the opposite direction (at least within 
families on low incomes). In fact, using MIS assumptions, this shows not that 
somewhat higher earnings are likely to create a couple penalty, but that having 
very low earnings are likely to make separation more damaging than if the family 
earned a bit more. Appendix 3 sets out a specific example of exactly how the 
system can raise the separation penalty for a family on the lowest earnings.  
 
An important question about in-work tax credits and the couple penalty is why the 
structure of the Working Tax Credit (WTC) does not appear to create a more 
systematic penalty for staying together. The WTC pays the same rate for a 
couple as for a lone parent, even though the former clearly have higher spending 
needs.  
 
This feature of the tax credit system seems unfair to many people, and helps 
explain why most child poverty in working families occurs where parents are 
living together rather than apart. However, it does not necessarily create a direct 
incentive to split up, since where a couple receiving WTC separates, it does not 
follow that the value of WTC will double. In the case of a couple where a father 
who is the sole earner leaves to set up a new single person household, he will no 
longer be eligible for the family WTC rate, and in all probability will get no tax 
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credits at all (because he is above the income threshold), while his partner will 
receive Income Support rather than WTC (because she is not working).  
 
If, on the other hand, both parents are working, in the pattern shown in this 
paper, the lone parent is likely to get WTC after splitting up, but the combined 
income of the couple may be too high to be eligible at all when together. Here, 
the favourability of the present tax credit system to a lone parent working part 
time for more than 16 hours does do much to help support the extra cost of 
separation (although does not necessarily overcompensate it). However, the 
single WTC rate itself is not the deciding factor.  
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Limitations and wider issues 
 
This paper has set out to answer a fairly narrow question: does the tax and 
benefit system make families with children materially better or worse off if they 
live separately? This is an important question to answer because the suggestion 
that the answer is ‘yes’ could be used as a rationale for altering relative benefit 
entitlements. However, it is only part of the picture. Some wider factors likely to 
influence the overall picture are noted below. In addition to these factors, we 
must also acknowledge that the most important rationales for couples to live 
together or apart have nothing to do with public policy but with things such as 
love, faithfulness and the social and emotional well-being of children. 
 
The dynamics of family formation 
 
The above analysis has made a ‘static’ comparison between families living 
together and apart. However, in practice, there may be different considerations 
applying to whether a couple should move in together or to split up. One 
consideration will be the extent to which they know in advance what kind of living 
situation will result from such decisions. For example, a parent considering 
whether to move in with their partner and children may have a much better idea 
of the cost (especially for housing) of living on their own than someone who has 
to move out and seek accommodation.  
 
Family arrangements cannot be switched on and off like a tap, and the 
consequences of a decision to live together or not can have effects over a long 
period – over which the earnings and employment status of those involved can 
vary considerably. Many people on low incomes have irregular working patterns.  
 
Thus, while the above calculations make specific assumptions about work and 
wages, family decisions cannot be made based on reliable ‘better off 
calculations’ that accurately reflect an uncertain future. Were we to have 
concluded that, across a range of circumstances, there was a clear and 
systematic couple or separation penalty, this would be relevant for people’s 
decision-making. Saying that in some circumstances you are better off and in 
some worse off as a couple is less likely to have an influence.  
 
This paper has not considered repartnering. It would be difficult for tax and 
benefit incentives to be structured in a way that took this into account.  
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Housing options 
 
An important difficulty with measuring a couple penalty, especially for working 
families, is that a calculation is heavily dependent on how much more it costs to 
live in two homes than one, which in turn depends on the specifics of housing 
costs. This paper has assumed that rent for the home with the children in 
remains constant, and shown two different examples of what a separated single 
adult might pay.  
 
However, in practice, there may be many other specific individual circumstances 
in which housing choices play a significant part in determining the well-being of 
families with children. One scenario is that a couple living in unsatisfactory 
housing has less priority for social housing than would a lone parent if the family 
separated. This could create a perverse incentive for separation. This, however, 
is an issue for housing supply and/or allocation rather than for the benefits 
system.  
 
Fraud 
 
Some calculations of a ‘couple penalty’ have been based on the greater total 
transfers received from the state by people living apart than living together. While 
this does not account for the greater living costs in the former situation, it could 
be argued that this provides an incentive to pretend that you are living apart, 
without actually incurring the extra cost of doing so. The existence of such 
financial advantages may thus be said to encourage fraud.  
 
Could this be an argument for restricting the amount the members of a family 
could gain, in absolute terms, in transfers from the state as a result of splitting up, 
in order to reduce incentives to fraud?  This would be a dangerous argument, 
since it would be using the possibility of fraud to restrict the level of social 
protection given to people (such as abandoned lone parents) in genuine need. A 
similar argument could be used to reduce support for people unable to find work, 
in order to tackle fraud among people who work but pretend not to be working. A 
more appropriate response is to tackle the fraud itself.  
 
Belief 
 
In 2008, a poll of people on benefits and in part-time work, commissioned for the 
Centre for Social Justice’s Dynamic Benefits report (p.114), showed that 53 per 
cent of respondents thought that couples on low incomes would be materially 
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better off living apart than together, and only 16 per cent thought the reverse. 
This belief has perhaps been encouraged by political statements about a couple 
penalty, which was becoming a prominent theme at that time. It may also be 
encouraged by anecdote and personal experience of cases where individuals are 
perceived to have ‘played the system’. It is not, however, helpful to such 
perceptions if it is publicly suggested, against the evidence, that benefits 
specifically over-compensate lone parents for their family’s living costs compared 
with what they would get as a couple. The risk is that this could help create the 
very behavioural effects that critics of a ‘couple penalty’ are concerned about.  
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Conclusion 
 
This paper set out to ask whether there is evidence to show, as some have 
asserted, that there is a systematic penalty in the tax and benefit system for 
couples with children on low incomes to stay together. It has found that the clear 
answer to this question is no. 
 
The calculation of such a penalty depends on which examples of family 
circumstances one chooses, and on crucial assumptions about the amount that 
single adults have to spend compared with couples in order to reach an 
equivalent standard of living.  
 
Figure 7 gives a snapshot of the overall results. The most clear-cut evidence is 
for out-of-work benefits, where no cases of a significant couple penalty were 
detected in this analysis. This involved comparing the benefits received by 
families living together and living apart to their relative spending needs, ignoring 
housing costs, which are covered separately for people on benefits. Whether 
judging needs by the MIS or by the official ‘equivalence scale’, the greatest 
‘couple penalty’ detected amounts to a negligible 0.1 per cent of what a family 
needs. Using the MIS criteria, splitting up would make families on benefits 
between 4 and 6 per cent worse off relative to their needs, depending on the 
number of children. Moreover, creating two separate households would ‘raise the 
stakes’ in terms of the absolute cost of making good the shortfall between benefit 
income and what families need to meet a minimum acceptable living standard. 
Typically, their disposable income is about a third below minimum requirements: 
borrowing to spend a higher proportion of these requirements would cost more 
where a family separation has raised the overall amount that family members 
require.  
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Figure 7  Summary of results 
 
 MIS scale OECD scale 
Scenario* One 
child 
Two 
child 
Three 
child 
Cncl 
flat 
Min 
wage
One 
child 
Two 
child 
Three 
child 
Cncl 
flat 
Min 
wage
Out of work     na     na 
Single earner           
Dual earner           
 
Key 
Couple penalty at least 5% of family need 
Separation penalty at least 5% of family need 
Neither couple nor separation penalty   
*Council flat scenario is where man gets council flat. That and minimum wage scenario are for 
families with two children. Wage is £9 an hour unless otherwise shown.  
 
For working families on low incomes, the picture is more complex and varied 
according to specific circumstances. Wage rates, the amount of work in the 
family and housing costs interact with the benefits and tax credits system in 
complex ways. However, there is no consistent couple penalty for working 
families with low incomes. The factor that is most likely to create a couple penalty 
is if someone is able to move out of the family to a very cheap living situation, 
such as renting a council flat, and thereby contain the increase in the overall 
living costs of the individuals involved. On the other hand, other factors such as 
having a single earner on a low wage, or having only one child, appear to be 
associated with a high cost of separation.  
 
The use of the MIS scale, which uses research into minimum living costs to show 
greater economies of living in a couple than the official equivalence scales, 
suggests that separation penalties are larger and couple penalties smaller than 
those scales would suggest. Indeed, it shows no case of significant couple 
penalty other than in the scenario where the absent parent is able to live cheaply 
in social housing. Moreover, even the official scale used by the Government (the 
OECD scale) does not show a clear-cut economic advantage for families on low 
earnings to split up. In the single earner cases shown here, it shows a couple 
penalty in one scenario, a separation penalty in one scenario and no difference in 
the other three. On the other hand, for a couple with two earners, it shows a 
substantial couple penalty in all but one of the five scenarios looked at here. So 
an in-work couple penalty can be identified for a particular group of couples on a 
particular set of assumptions.  
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When the precise terms of the Universal Credit are known, it will be possible to 
see whether it replicates or changes these patterns. For working families, a key 
decision will be exactly how much income to disregard in the case of lone 
parents and couples before withdrawing the credit with rising earnings. But the 
most basic question will be the level at which to set the main component of the 
credit itself: this will affect entitlements both in and out of work. Existing Income 
Support rates are the starting point for this decision. The implication of 
statements about benefit rates creating an incentive to split up is that the 
Government would like to increase the gap between the single adult and couple 
elements of this support. To do so on this basis would be profoundly mistaken. 
The most clear-cut conclusion of this paper is that there is no evidence of a 
couple penalty in out-of-work benefits.  
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Notes 
1. Actually the single Income Support rate is 64 per cent of the couple 
rate, but a precise calculation that is compatible with the way ‘After 
Housing Cost’ income is calculated elsewhere requires water costs to 
be subtracted from income in both cases. Here, we use the researched 
MIS figures to represent water costs.  
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Appendix 1 
Detailed calculations of couple penalty by scenario 
 
Table 1  Basis for benchmarks using equivalisation 
 
2009/10 77% Median After Housing Costs (AHC) 274.12 
Earnings increase (Labour Force Survey – October 2009 
to April 2011, average weekly earnings) 1.034 
April 2011 estimate 283.36 
 
Equivalisation weightings AHC OECD McClements 
   
First adult 0.58 0.55 
Second adult 0.42 0.45 
Child aged 12 0.2 0.25 
Child aged 7 0.2 0.21 
Child aged 3 0.2 0.18 
 
Actual benchmarks shown in the following tables are derived by adding up 
weightings for the children involved, adding first and second adult for a couple 
together and two times first adult for living apart, and multiplying the total by 
£283.36. The benchmark for MIS adds together all living cost elements other 
than rent, council tax, childcare and water charges (water charges are counted 
as a housing cost), using the Minimum Income Calculator at 
www.minimumincome.org.uk. This calculator is also used to calculate net income 
in the different scenarios, from which council tax, childcare and water are 
subtracted.  
 
 
A minor technical anomaly in the MIS calculations of water charges (due 
to differences in the water suppliers specified by different household 
groups), showing higher water costs for a lone parent with two children 
than for a couple with two children, is adjusted in these calculations in 
order not to imply a more favourable position for couples than actually 
exists (we assume lone parent has the same charge as the couple in this 
case). 
Table 2  Results for one child case  
 
Based on a couple plus one child aged 7. Wage is £9 per hour and rent is a council rent for the parent living with children and a 
private sector rent for the single (25th percentile, England, one bedroom). 
 
Income benchmarks  Apr 2011: AHC income not including childcare (£ per week) 
OECD 77% median McClements 77% median* MIS 
 
Together 340.03 342.87 322.10 
Apart 385.37 371.20 407.50 
*McClements scale used for weighting, but base figure is equivalised income as calculated using OECD scale. 
Couple penalty: percentage above or below needs 
Actual income net of 
rent, c tax, water 
Comparison to benchmarks 
% OECD % McClements % MIS 
a) Neither working     
Together 177.53 -47.8% -48.2% -44.9% 
Apart 201.42 -47.7% -45.7% -50.6% 
%pts couple pen  0.1% 2.5% -5.7% 
b) Father working full time, 
mother not working 
    
Together 253.68 -25.4% -26.0% -21.2% 
Apart 302.68 -21.5% -18.5% -25.7% 
%pts couple pen  3.9% 7.6% -4.5% 
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c) Father working full time, 
mother half time 
    
Together 334.75 -1.6% -2.4% 3.9% 
Apart 376.47 -2.3% 1.4% -7.6% 
%pts couple pen -0.8% 3.8% -11.5% 
Couple penalty (£s) based on difference between actual income and needs 
Actual net income Comparison to benchmarks (difference)
OECD McClements MIS 
a) Neither working     
Together 177.53 -162.50 -165.34 -144.57 
Apart 201.42 -183.95 -169.78 -206.08 
£s couple pen -21.45 -4.45 -61.51 
b) Father working full time, 
mother not working 
Together 253.68 -86.35 -89.19 -68.42 
Apart 302.68 -82.69 -68.52 -104.82 
£s couple pen 3.66 20.66 -36.40 
c) Father working full time, 
mother half time 
Together 334.75 -5.29 -8.12 12.65 
Apart 376.47 -8.90 5.26 -31.03 
£s couple pen -3.62 13.38 -43.68 
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Table 3  Results for two child case 
 
Based on a couple plus one child aged 3 and one child aged 7. Wage is £9 per hour and rent is a council rent for the parent living 
with children and a private sector rent for the single (25th percentile, England, one bedroom). 
 
 
 Income benchmarks Apr 2011: AHC income not including childcare (£ per week) 
 OECD 77% median McClements 77% 
median* MIS 
 
Together 396.70 393.87 397.01 
Apart 442.04 422.21 466.69 
*McClements scale used for weighting, but base figure is equivalised income as calculated using OECD scale. 
Couple penalty: percentage above or below needs 
Actual income net of 
rent, c tax, water Comparison to benchmarks 
% OECD % McClements % MIS
a) Neither working 
Together 241.98 -39.0% -38.6% -39.0%
Apart 265.87 -39.9% -37.0% -43.0%
%pts couple pen -0.9% 1.5% -4.0%
b) Father working full time, mother 
not working
    
Together 319.32 -19.5% -18.9% -19.6%
Apart 367.13 -16.9% -13.0% -21.3%
%pts couple pen 2.6% 5.9% -1.8%
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c) Father working full time, mother 
half time
    
Together 373.81 -5.8% -5.1% -5.8%
Apart 449.18 1.6% 6.4% -3.8%
%pts couple pen 7.4% 11.5% 2.1%
Couple penalty (£s) based on difference between actual income and needs 
Actual net income Comparison to benchmarks (difference)
OECD McClements MIS
a) Neither working 
Together 241.98 -154.72 -151.89 -155.03
Apart 265.87 -176.17 -156.34 -200.82
£s couple pen -21.45 -4.45 -45.79
b) Father working full time, mother 
not working
    
Together 319.32 -74.5504 -77.69
Apart 367.13 -74.91 -55.08 -99.56
£s couple pen 2.47 19.47 -21.87
c) Father working full time, mother 
half time
    
Together 373.81 -22.89 -20.06 -23.20
Apart 449.18 7.14 26.97 -17.51
£s couple pen 30.03 47.03 5.69
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Table 4  Results for three child case 
 
Based on a couple plus one child aged 3, one child aged 7 and one child aged 11. Wage is £9 per hour and rent is a council rent 
for the parent living with children and a private sector rent for the single (25th percentile, England, one bedroom). 
 
Income benchmarks  Apr 2011: AHC income not including childcare (£ per week) 
OECD 77% median McClements 77% median* MIS 
 
Together 453.38 464.71 493.79 
Apart 498.71 493.05 569.48 
*McClements scale used for weighting, but base figure is equivalised income as calculated using OECD scale. 
Couple penalty: percentage above or below needs 
Actual income net of 
rent, c tax, water Comparison to benchmarks 
 % OECD % McClements % MIS 
a) Neither working    
Together 301.26 -33.6% -35.2% -39.0% 
Apart 325.15 -34.8% -34.1% -42.9% 
%pts couple pen  -1.3% 1.1% -3.9% 
b) Father working full time, mother 
not working 
 
Together 389.88 -14.0% -16.1% -21.0% 
Apart 426.41 -14.5% -13.5% -25.1% 
%pts couple pen  -0.5% 2.6% -4.1% 
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c) Father working full time, 
mother half time 
 
Together 426.54 -5.9% -8.2% -13.6% 
Apart 519.85 4.2% 5.4% -8.7% 
%pts couple pen 10.2% 13.7% 4.9% 
Couple penalty (£s) based on difference between actual income and needs 
Actual net income Comparison to benchmarks (difference) 
 OECD McClements MIS 
a) Neither working     
Together 301.26 -152.12 -163.45 -192.53 
Apart 325.15 -173.56 -167.90 -244.33 
£s couple pen  -21.45 -4.45 -51.80 
b) Father working full time, 
mother not working     
Together 389.88 -63.50 -74.83 -103.91 
Apart 426.41 -72.30 -66.64 -143.07 
£s couple pen  -8.81 8.19 -39.16 
c) Father working full time, 
mother half time     
Together 426.54 -26.84 -38.17 -67.25 
Apart 519.85 21.14 26.80 -49.63 
£s couple pen  47.97 64.97 17.62 
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Table 5  Results for ‘man gets council flat’ case 
 
Based on a couple plus one child aged 3 and one child aged 7. Wage is £9 per hour and rent is a council rent for all.  
 
Income benchmarks  Apr 2011: AHC income not including childcare (£ per week) 
 OECD 77% median McClements 77% median* MIS 
Together 396.70 393.87 397.01 
Apart 442.04 422.21 466.69 
*McClements scale used for weighting, but base figure is equivalised income as calculated using OECD scale. 
Couple penalty: percentage above or below needs 
Actual income net of 
rent, c tax, water Comparison to benchmarks 
% OECD %McClements %MIS 
a) Neither working     
Together 241.98 -39.0% -38.6% -39.0% 
Apart 265.87 -39.9% -37.0% -43.0%
%pts couple pen -0.9% 1.5% -4.0%
b) Father working full time, 
mother not working 
    
Together 319.32 -19.5% -18.9% -19.6% 
Apart 402.98 -8.8% -4.6% -13.7%
%pts couple pen 10.7% 14.4% 5.9%
c) Father working full time, 
mother half time
    
Together 373.81 -5.8% -5.1% -5.9% 
Apart 485.03 9.7% 14.9% 3.9% 
%pts couple pen 15.5% 20.0%    9.8%
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Couple penalty (£s) based on difference between actual income and needs 
 
Actual net income Comparison to benchmarks (difference)
OECD McClements MIS
a) Neither working 
Together 241.98 -154.724 -151.8904 -155.03
Apart 265.87 -176.1716 -156.3364 -200.82
£s couple pen -21.45 -4.45 -45.79
b) Father working full time 
Together 319.32 -77.384 -74.5504 -77.69
Apart 402.98 -39.0616 -19.2264 -63.71
£s couple pen 38.32 55.32 13.98
c) Father working full time, 
Together 373.81 -22.89 -20.06 -23.20
Apart 485.03 42.99 62.82 18.34
£s couple pen 65.88 82.88 41.54
   
41 
Table 6  Results for ‘minimum wage’ case 
 
Based on a couple plus one child aged 3 and one child aged 7. Wage is £5.93 per hour (national minimum wage April 2011) and 
rent is a council rent for the parent living with children and a private sector rent for the single (25th percentile, England, one 
bedroom). 
 
Income benchmarks Apr 2011: AHC income not including childcare (£ per week) 
OECD 77% median McClements 77% median* MIS 
 
Together 396.70 393.87 397.01 
Apart 442.04 422.21 466.69 
*McClements scale used for weighting, but base figure is equivalised income as calculated using OECD scale. 
Couple penalty: percentage above or below needs 
Actual income net 
of rent, c tax, water Comparison to benchmarks 
a) Neither working % OECD %McClements %MIS 
Together 241.98 -39.0% -38.6% -39.0% 
Apart 265.87 -39.9% -37.0% -43.0% 
%pts couple pen -0.9% 1.5% -4.0% 
b) Father working full time, mother 
not working 
Together 314.55 -20.7% -20.1% -20.8% 
Apart 315.29 -28.7% -25.3% -32.4% 
%pts couple pen -8.0% -5.2% -11.7% 
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c) Father working full time, mother 
half time 
Together 320.67 -19.2% -18.6% -19.2% 
Apart 392.84 -11.1% -7.0% -15.8% 
%pts couple pen 8.0% 11.6% 3.4% 
Couple penalty (£s) based on difference between actual income and needs 
 
Actual net income Comparison to benchmarks (difference) 
 OECD McClements MIS 
a) Neither working     
Together 241.98 -154.72 -151.89 -155.03 
Apart 265.87 -176.17 -156.34 -200.82 
£s couple pen  -21.45 -4.45 -45.79 
b) Father working full time, mother 
not working 
    
Together 314.55 -82.15 -79.32 -82.46 
Apart 315.29 -126.75 -106.92 -151.40 
£s couple pen  -44.60 -27.60 -68.94 
c) Father working full time, mother 
half time 
    
Together 320.67 -76.03 -73.20 -76.34 
Apart 392.84 -49.20 -29.37 -73.85 
£s couple pen  26.83 43.83 2.49 
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Table 7  Results for ‘high couple penalty’ case 
 
Based on a couple plus one child aged 3, one child aged 7 and one child aged 11. Wage is £9 per hour and rent is a council rent 
for all. 
 
Income benchmarks  Apr 2011: AHC income not including childcare (£ per week) 
OECD 77% median McClements 77% median* MIS 
Together 453.38 464.71 493.79 
Apart 498.71 493.05 569.48 
*McClements scale used for weighting, but base figure is equivalised income as calculated using OECD scale. 
Couple penalty: percentage above or below needs 
Actual income net of rent, 
c tax, water Comparison to benchmarks 
OECD McClements MIS 
Father working full time, mother 
half time 
    
Together 426.54 -5.9% -8.2% -13.6% 
Apart 555.70 11.4% 12.7% -2.4% 
%pts couple pen  17.3% 20.9% 11.2% 
Couple penalty (£s) based on difference between actual income and needs 
Together 426.54 -26.84 -38.17 -67.25 
Apart 555.70 56.99 62.65 -13.78 
£s couple pen 83.82 100.82 53.47 
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Table 8  Results for ‘high separation penalty’ case 
 
Based on a couple plus one child aged 7. Wage is £5.93 (national minimum wage April 2011) and rent is a council rent for the 
parent living with children and a private sector rent for the single (25th percentile, England, one bedroom). 
 Income benchmarks Apr 2011: AHC income not including childcare (£ per week) 
OECD 77% median McClements 77% median* MIS 
 
Together 340.03 342.87 322.10 
Apart 385.37 371.20 407.50 
*McClements scale used for weighting, but base figure is equivalised income as calculated using OECD scale. 
Couple penalty: percentage above or below needs 
Actual income net of rent, 
c tax, water Comparison to benchmarks 
OECD McClements MIS 
Father working full time, mother 
not working 
Together 238.70 -29.8% -30.4% -25.9% 
Apart 250.84 -34.9% -32.4% -38.4% 
%pts couple pen  -5.1% -2.0% -12.6% 
Couple penalty (£s) based on difference between actual income and needs 
Father working full time mother 
not working 
Together 238.70 -101.33 -104.17 -83.40 
Apart 250.84 -134.53 -120.36 -156.66 
£s couple pen  -33.20 -16.20 -73.26 
Appendix 2  
A weighting for singles compared with couples in the Minimum 
Income Standard 
 
The following calculations consider the relative needs of single adults and couples in the 
MIS. These relative adult needs can vary somewhat according to the number of children 
in the family. For example, where a couple separates, the joint food bill will be greater 
because of fewer economies of scale (for example, by buying larger packs of food). 
However, the saving will be different in the context of a couple without children (having 
now to shop twice for one person rather than once for a couple) and a couple with two 
children (moving from a four-person shop to a one-person and a three-person shop), 
due to the specifics of the prices of food in different quantities.   
 
Each calculation here compares the after housing cost budgets for couples and singles 
with a given number of children. The difference between these amounts represents the 
additional cost of having a second adult in the household. This is compared with the 
overall cost of a couple, using the MIS budget for a couple without children – just as 
equivalence scales express weightings relative to a benchmark case of a couple without 
children. The single person’s weighting as a percentage of a couple is calculated as one 
minus the percentage difference between single person and couple costs.  
 
Table 9  Equivalisation – Minimum Income Standard after housing 
costs 2011 (£ per week) 
 
Number of 
children 
Couple 
budget 
Single 
adult 
budget 
Difference £s 
(how much couple 
costs compared 
with single) 
Difference as 
proportion of 
couple 
without 
children 
(£262.10) 
Implied 
single 
weighting 
No children 262.10 165.57 96.53 0.37 0.63 
One child 
aged 1 302.49 222.01 80.48 0.31 0.69 
Two children 
age 3 and 7 396.99 301.12 95.87 0.37 0.63 
Three 
children aged 
3, 7 and 11 
493.76 403.89 89.87 0.34 0.66 
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Appendix 3  
An example of how lower earnings can make people relatively worse 
off as a result of separation 
 
The figures presented above show a substantial separation penalty, based on MIS 
figures, for single earner couples, which was £47 greater for someone on the minimum 
wage of £5.93 an hour in April 2011 than for someone earning the much higher wage of 
£9 an hour. Table 10 shows these figures, together with the different amounts that 
people receive from the state in each case.  
 
The £47 difference in the separation penalty is accounted for by the fact that additional 
tax credit support available to help cover the extra cost of two households is £36 greater 
where the man earns £9 an hour than £5.93, while the additional Housing Benefit 
support is £11 higher.  
 
The reason for this lies mainly with the amount that the couple with children receives in 
state support. The situation of the non-working partner who becomes a lone parent is 
unaffected by the wage of her partner. The situation of the working man who sets up a 
household on his own is affected only a bit, because even on the minimum wage he has 
only a small entitlement to tax credits and Housing Benefit. Once this has run out, he 
can keep 68 per cent of his additional earnings, after paying tax and national insurance. 
On the other hand, the couple with two children receive tax credits, Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Credit, and lose all of these as they earn more. Along with tax and national 
insurance, this allows them to keep only about 5p of each extra pound that the man 
earns, up to about £9 an hour.  
 
As a consequence, the man’s additional earnings from the higher wage produce over 
£50 a week net when he is living on his own, but less than £5 when he is living in a 
couple. This makes things relatively more favourable for a family that splits up on this 
higher rate of pay – because more earnings are going into the father’s pocket rather 
than being reflected in reduced entitlements. However, as noted above, this still does 
not create a couple penalty in this particular higher earning case: it just reduces the net 
cost of separation. 
 
  
47 
Table 10  Situation of a couple with one full time earner, on two 
different wage rates 
 
Needs compared with income 
Min wage MIS need Actual Difference 
Together 397.01 314.55 -82.46 
Apart 466.69 315.29 -151.40 
£s separation penalty 68.94 
£9/hr MIS need Actual Difference 
Together 397.01 319.32 -77.69 
Apart 466.69 367.13 -99.56 
£s separation penalty 21.87 
What the state pays 
Min wage Tax credits + 
Income Support 
Housing 
Benefit + 
Council 
Tax Benefit 
 
Couple 156.64 32.01 
Lone mother 175.79 92.89 
Separated father 11.04 15.41 Total 
How much less together 
than apart 30.19 76.29 106.48 
£9/hr 
Couple 109.58 5.70 
Lone mother 175.79 92.89 
Separated father 0 0 Total 
How much less together 
than apart 66.21 87.19 153.40 
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